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After presenting a topic for the Feminist Scholarship Review, I ask this amorphous question 
of our contributors: "Write about women and your field of expertise." The responses from the 
brave scholars who take it on are vast and interesting. Though, honestly, it is exactly the kind of 
question I would complain about if a professor gave it to me. Philosophy g ives me the same lost 
and overwhelmed feeling giant questions give me. 
For me, philosophy (as a discipline) teases me with the false security of an often simply stated 
idea before the questioning starts and the ground shifts, dumping me into weightless space and 
giving me a headache. Then there are those brave souls who actually sign up for or major in 
philoliOplty! THEN there an: the few who pursue doctorate dczrccs in philosophy and make a 
lifelong pursuit of it! Dr. Helen Lang, Dr. Drew Hyland and Dr. Dan Uoyd are the brave phi-
losophers who graciously contributed their gleanings on women and philosophy to this issue. 
Dr. Helen L1111g is the Director of the Trinity College Philosophy Department. Her essay is 
about lhe woman philosopher she knows best: herself. Lang discusses balancitlg the daily re-
sponsibilities of motherhood and scholarship. Lang then implies a simple question: "What is 
your personal philosophy and how does it inform all aspects of your life?" Lang's life philoso-
phy is based upon Philosophy as a discipline which she applies by "examining arguments and 
ideas" through her "individual context of expe.rience." This essay explores the continuity of life 
between its competing aspects and Lang's personal philosophy that informs her actions and 
untangles commitments, responsibilities and experie.nces. 
Dr. Drew Hyland reflects on postmodernist feminist review of Platonic dialogue. 
Postmodernism is invaluable for validating women's experiences of being left out oi history. It 
can, however, complicate true historical understanding by inappropriately injecting modern 
consciousness and social reality into Plato's intention, for example. Hyland suggests Platonic 
dialogue is not an outline of gender dynamics in ancient Greece. As drama, the Platonic dia-
logues could have reflected any social reality. Hyland explains the difference between modem 
feminism which focuses on "ethical, political or social justice principles" and the intention of 
Platonic dialogues: to explore the nature of philosophy. 
Dr. Dan Lloyd relates The Ccnnected Classroom, teaching forum to Platonic dialogue uphold-
ing both as ideal teaching methods. The Ccnnecfed Classroom honors cooperative dialogue 
between students and teachers which diffuses the power imbalance of the lecture form. Equality 
and dialogue, according to Hyland, will forge the path to wisdom embraced by Socrates and 
Plato. Lloyd joins erotic en.ergy and pursuit of wi!>dom, describing eros as the charge of inspira-
tion that can foster wisdom through the intimate exchange of kn.owledge. 
Reading each essay and observing the absence of women between ancient Greece and con-
temporary America, I immediately thought of Virginia Woolf's philosophy in "A Room of One's 
Own," that women could not become great writers until they had a legacy of ancC$tral women 
writers upon whom to lean. Women philosophers, those lost in the past and those struggling 
today, still wait for their legacy to evolve. Meanwhile, scholars like Lang, Hyland and Uoyd have 
contributed their voices and expertise to the growing discourse on Women and Philosophy. 
Beth Miller-Lee 
Women and Philosophy 
D1: Helen Lang, Director of the Trinity College Philosophy Department 
Our daughters still tease me, asking why my first book was completed only a year 
after they graduated high school (they are rwins) and left home. Was it, they ask, that my 
workload was significantly reduced and so 1 had time to do something I had never done 
before? A second book followed rather quickly. In one way, the answer is "yes:" after they 
left home l did have significantly more time. But in a more important way the answer is 
"no:" the philosophical maturity represented by my first book presents my own growth and 
sense of myself. 
Every parent complains of the balancing act required of working and parenting. But 
historically, the problem has been much more serious for women than for men, in part for 
biological reasons, women give birth and nurse, and in part for historical reasons, women 
have been excluded from the work force, particularly professors. And academe is a profes-
sion: we never clock in and never clock out, the work seems endless and the workday end-
lessly expandable. 
The work of this profession contains great variety. We teach stude.nts, work with our 
peers and colleagues on committees that govern the institution, and do a host of things alone 
in the library, our office, or at home, such as scholarly work, grading papers, and writing 
letters of recommendation. I have served rwo terms as chair of the Philosophy Department 
and this position opens up a whole new realm of tlemam.b and rewards. 
One point should be made immediately, if only so that it can be set aside. Studies 
show that women's pay for equal work lags considerably in other professions. The old 
statistic of70 cents for every dollar a man earns has not changed that much. And this point 
was also true at Trinity College until about ten years ago, when a blind study showed gender 
bias and the College corrected it. Neither past injustices nor the mark of the past on the 
future were addressed, but the future was assured as a better future. 
Bm the more important point for me has to do with philosophy as a discipline. It is a 
discipline that examines arguments and ideas; it looks at the foundations of science and 
society, the foundations of the values we hold (or think we hold). In order to conduct such 
examination, one must be willing to talce the time to think about the character of experience, 
whether the experience of knowing something, of feeling prejudice, of participating in a 
social structure. And such examination can be (indeed, in my view should be) conducted in a 
variety of settings. Il is what I think I do when I teach, what I think I do when I work writing 
scholarly articles or a book, sometimes what I do for personal fulfillment. 
And it is certainly something I do as a parent. I remember the protests, rising to 
shrieks, when 1 told my daughters that according to Aristotle parents love their children more 
than children Jove their parents. I also reflected privately later that when I lost this argument, 
I in fact won. When they were adolescents and complaining about every possible body part, 
I told them Aristotle comments that if a work of art could come to life it would not thank its 
maker as much as the maker might expect. They responded by inventing remarks they 
would like to address to their maker. "When you think thighs," one said, "think longer, think 
thinner." 
I always said that I would not write a book until I had "a book sized idea." In phi-
losophy as a discipline, many books are just expanded and badly written essays. And I 
learned more about writing by working with our daughters on their papers than I ever could 
have learned on my own. Can it be an accident that I had such an idea when they were in 
high school? No, probably not. 
When our daughters were in high school, I felt considerable frustration about my 
workload. I wanted to be with them, shopping, working-out and a host of other things. At 
the same time, I bad been promoted to full professor and so acquired new responsibilities 
here at Trinity. I expressed my frustration to a colleague who replied with great passion that 
his youngest child had graduated high school and gone off to college. "These days never 
come again - take advantage of them. You can always return to a larger role at the College 
but you can never have this time with your children again." Our children are now both 
graduate students and each comments to me from time to time bow much they miss our 
discussions. 
On the one hand, I have had good luck: the gift of health for our family, external 
support that many women lack, and good advice from friends and colleagues. On the other 
hand, I found a profession and subject matter for which I feel enormous and lasting passion 
and which has allowed me to have it all: a full-time job that I love, children whom I adore, 
and work that I find profoundly fulfilling. 
The unity and fulfillment of my life often seems to me to be the unity and fulfill-
ment of philosophy as a discipline. Other women will surely fmd other interests and must 
have the right to enter any profession. But my wish for them is the same as my wish for our 
daughters, that they find for themselves what philosophy has given me. 
The Difference the Difference Makes: 
The Question of Woman in Plato 
Dr. Drew A. Hyland 
In the last few decades, feminist philosophers have stimulated much new research and 
debate by examining, often critically, many of the canonical figures in western philosophy with a 
special eye to their position, explicit and implicit, on women .• One of the more controversial of 
U1ese canonical figures has been Plato, and the reason is simple enough, that the evidence in the 
dialogues regarding Plato's and/ or Socrates' attitude toward women is at once complex and very, 
very ambiguous. 
for that reason, some feminist writers have been most struck by what they consider the 
deep and abiding sexism and even misogyny reflected in the dialogues. ·These attitudes suggest that 
Socrates and Plato were, perhaps not surprisin$1Y, "products of their time," who consciously or 
unconsciously bought into the deeply sexist mores of Athenian society. Such writers have, to say 
the least, a rich body of prime facie evidence to cite in the dialogues. ln the Symoosium, the 
women are dismissed from the party when serious discussion is to begin and the dominant con-
ception of eros discussed is that among males. In the Tjmaeu.s, in the mythical account of the 
cosmos where the development of human beings is discussed, we are told that "the superior sex is 
tl1at which hereafter should be designated 'man' C!'imaeus 42a), and in the reincarnation myth we 
are told that should a male live a life dominated by pleasure and passion, "he will be changed into 
a woman's nature at the second birth." (42c). And in the Republic . there is regular reference to 
not wanting the people who will rule in the "City in the Sl..-y," even the women, to act like women 
<RepubliC 39!:>d, 469d, GOSe). On the surface, then, the dialogues are full of apparently unret1ec-
tive sexism. Little wonder that writers struck by this evidence should be relatively unimpressed by 
citations of apparent counter evidence that tl1ere are strains of a kind of proto-feminism in the 
dialogues., 
The strongest of such evidence surely occurs in tile Republic, a'nd especially in the first of 
the famous "three waves," in Book V, where a strong and apparently serious argument is made that 
when it comes to the qualities necessary for the two crucial tasks of the philosopher-rulers, that is, 
philosophical ability and capacity to rule, there is finally no interesting difference between men 
and women. The other strong evidence is the regular predilection of the Platonic Socrates to praise 
among his teachers only women: Diotima, who teaches him eros in the SVmoosium, and Aspasia, 
courtesan of Pericles, who teaches him rhetoric in the Menexenus .• 
The task of evaluating the overall attitudes of Plato or even the Platonic Socrates would be 
much too much for this short paper. But before turning to the more narrow issue I want to ad-
dress, let me at least say a few words about the direction one would have to take in resolving these 
larger issues. 
To resolve the question of whether the many overtly sexist and misogynous remarks in the 
dialogues are indicative of the real views of Plato or the Platonic Socrates, we would have first to 
decide on a fundamental principle of interpretation regarding the dialogues. Do we follow a 
version of Gregory Vlastos' famous principle that anything that Socrates says in any dialogue is 
what Plato believes at the tinle? Or even expand Vlastos' principle to say that anything that anyone 
in the dialogues says is reflective of Plato's views?. Then we will not have much trouble deciding on 
Plato's attitude toward women. On the other hand, if we side with those many interpreters of Plato 
who argue that the dialogues must be interpreted as the dramas they are, with a wide variety of 
views presented not all of which are necessarily shared by the author, then things get much more 
complicated .• We would have to look at the many instances in their context, decide whether they 
are simply dramatic reflections of the views of the characters, or whether they are appeals to the 
prejudices of the audience, or whether irony is at work, or whether they are the views of the 
author, not to mention other possible explanations. Obviously this is a complex task; but just as 
obviously, anyone committed to this hermeneutic principle will be dissatisfied at what looks like a 
too easy appeal to whatever anyone says in the dialogues as "Plato's view." 
The same controversy would hold in the case of those passages where evidence of a kind of 
proto-feminism is present in the dialogues. Are they too reflections of the views of Plato, in which 
case we would have to conclude from the dialogues as a whole that he is profoundly ambivalent 
and even confused in his attitudes towards women? Or, on the second hypothesis, would we not 
have to examine those passages too with regard to questions of dramatic significance, rhetorical 
import, irony, or authorial intention? 
In this short paper I will not presume to judge on those complex issues, although I have 
done so elsewhere (see note 4) . Instead, I want to hazard a hypothesis regarding the roots of those 
passages where a Platonic character, usually Socrates, seems to hold to some version or other of 
what we today would call feminist principles. I will concentrate, then, on the putative evidence, 
mostly in the Republic. Symposium. and Menexenos, where Plato's characters seem much more 
favorable to women. In those passages I want to suggest, first, that in no case, does the proto-
feminist position seem based on ethical, political, or social justice principles. They have nothing to 
do with social egalitarianism, or women's rights, or even human rights. Instead, tile reasons are 
entirely philosophic. More pointedly, I want to argue that the occasional concern for women's 
status in the dialogues is directed not to a concern for real. women in Athenian or any other society, 
for their social condition, but rather to the nature of philosophy. It is philosophy that requires in 
its very nature both "masculine" and "feminine" elements (I use these terms throughout to refer 
only to their general socially constructed meanings, both in ancient Athens and still to a large 
extent in contemporary cultures.) , and therefore it is Plato's concern with what I will call the 
androgynous nature of philosophy that is the source of what "feminism" is present in the dia-
logues. Let me see if I can begin to make a case for this claim. 
Begin wi.th the famous "three waves" of Plato's Republic. For our purposes, the crucial 
"waves" are the first, which argues for equal education, treatment, and opportunity to become 
philosophic ru.lers for both women and men, and the lhird, which asserts lhal only if such equally 
educated and developed men and women are allowed to rule will justice be established in a city. 
Recall a point perhaps too often overlooked, that the entire effort to construct a "city in speech," of 
which the lhree waves are a crucial part, was originally motivated (all the way back i.n Book II at 
368d ff.) by the famous "city-soul" analogy, Socrates' effort to get a better look at justice in the 
individual soul by looking at its supposedly "larger" counterpart, justice in the city. That analogy 
suggests that when something is asserted about justice in the city, the ultimate philosophic point is 
to examine its relevance to the individual soul. Let us, then, examine what if any relevance there 
may be to the principles of the first and third waves when applied to the individual soul.. Is there 
an analogue to the idea of equal treatment and education of women and men, and that women and 
men are equally qualified for ruling, when applied to the in.dividual soul? To find it, we would 
have to translate the social-political distinction between men and women into an analogy within 
the individual soul. I susgest that we take "men" and ''women" to refer to the "masculine" and 
"feminine" elements within the individual soul. Such a figurative application of the city-soul 
analogy would suggest that just as every city has within it both men and women, so every indi-
vidual soul has a "masculine" and a "feminine" dimension. Moreover, the analogy suggests that, 
in a healthy or just soul, both dimensions must be treated equally, given equal opportunity for 
develooment. and if we do. the soul in question will become well- prepared for philosophy and for 
ruling. That is, philosophy is equally available for women and for men, and for a good reason: it 
requires both masculine and feminine elements. It is in that sense that I want to claim that phi-
losophy itself is androgynous. Is there evidence in support of this view in other dialogues? 
I begin with a striking dramatic fact to which I have already alluded. Socrates praises only 
two of his teachers in the dialogues, and they are both women: Aspasia, who teaches him rhetoric 
in the Menexenus, and Diotima, who teaches him eros in the Symposium. They in turn share two 
striking things. They are both women, and they are both involved with eros. Aspasia, as the 
courtesan of Pericles, makes erotics her profession, and Diotima teaches eros to Socrates. But eros 
is intimately tied to philosophy. 
It is in Diotima's teaching to Socrates on eros, which he recounts in the 5vmposjum, that we 
see something of the depth of the connection between the feminine and philosophy for Plato. First 
of all, her teaching on eros, as others have seen, is replete with feminine itnagery and themes. She 
invokes in a crucial way the theme of pregna.ncy: Thanks to our eros, "All humans are pregnant, 
Socrates, both in body and in soul." (Symposium Z06c). If "all humans" are pregnant, then clearly, 
there is a feminine principle in all of us. Moreover, the pregnancy of our eros leads us to desire to 
give birth. Not just physical pregnancy and birth (which Diotima insists is something "divine" 
l206cl) but all desire to create or reproduce has its source in our erotic pregnancy. Diotima here 
corrects Agathon's supposition that eros both is beautiful and loves the beautiful by telling Socrates 
the real connection of eros and beauty: eros exhibits a natural desire to give birth and it always 
seeks to give birth in the beautiful (206c). Finally, the creative urge contained in our eros is in 
quest of immortality (207a). 
This strong presence of the feminine in Diotima's speech has been noticed by others. Susan 
Hawthorne, in "Diotima Speaks Through the Body," (in Engendering Origins 83-96) nicely delin-
eates the prof11sion of feminine metaphors in Diotima's speech, but concludes that this implies the 
historical reality of Diotima, presumably because the male Plato couldn't have thought of this. 
David Halperin, in "Why Is Diotima a Woman?" (Chapter 6 of A Hundred Years of Homosexuality: 
and other Essays on Greek Love !New York: Routledge, 1990]) also is sensitive to the rich feminine 
imagery of her speech: "Plato's theory of erotic procreativity, in short, is oriented aro11nd what his 
contemporaries would have take.n to be a distinctively feminine order of experience." (138). But 
he adds that the fact that the male Socrates tells the story somehow vitiates the feminine dimension 
(139- 145) conclucfin& that L11e speech "does not :simply represent an instance of male cultural 
imperialism, a typical attempt by men to colonize female 'difference' in order to claim it for a 
universalizing male discourse," in addition it "den(ies) in effect the autonomy of women's experi-
ence." (145). Though both Hawthorne's and Halperin's readings are possible, they both exhibit a 
more negative, critical stance than I think is called for. I want to suggest a more positive reacfin& of 
this feminine imagery, that Diotima's speech clearly shows that genuine eros (and so philosophy) 
must contain both feminine and masculine elements. 
Clearly, then, part of what Diotima does, ir,deed part of the significance of her being a 
woman, is that she introduces a necessary feminine element into what had heretofore in the 
dialogue been predominantly masculine accounts of eros. She, as it were, "corrects" the previous 
speeches in part by filling in a decisive lacuna: the significance of the feminine in eros., 
This is made even more explicit at an important point in her speech, when Socrates asks 
her the odd question as to who e~ parents are, and she responds with the mythical account of 
eroS parentage (203b ff). Her account contradicts the earlier one of Pausanias, who, not surpris-
ingly given his own sexual prefe.rences, had argued that white "base" or "vulgar" eros is hetero-
sexual, "noble" or "heavenly'' eros, like the noble Aphrodite to which it corresponds, is "of the 
male only." (180e ff). On the contrary, Diotima asserts, eros, the one eros, is the child of the 
heterosexual parents Pores (Plenty, Resol.lrcefulness) and Penia (Poverty, Lack). In the para-
graphs that follow, Diotima goes on to explain in detail how eros, like so many children, takes after 
both its parents. In some ways it is resourceflll, clever, overflowing, like its father. But in other 
ways it is poor, lacking, striving for what it lacks, like its mother. We might well cavil at the asso-
ciation of the feminine with lack or incompleteness, though as the case of Freud Sllggests, it is a 
prejudice hardly confined to Diotima or even to the ancient Greeks. Even so, we should not miss 
the larger and more fundamental Diotiman point, that eros, both noble and base eros we can add, 
partakes of both the masculine and feminine, that it is indeed "a discrete mixture of masclllinity 
and femininity."• 
To this we must add a second crucial consequence, adumbrated as early as Pausanias' 
speech ( 182b) and articulated explicitly by Diotima in her fan10us "ascent passage" at 21 Oa ff: 
Philosophy is itself a manifestation, indeed the highest manifestation, of eros. At the highest stage 
of the erotic ascent, after having experienced the "lower" forms of bodily and psychical eros and 
now prepared to get a glimpse of "Beauty Itself," Diotima tells Socrates, we attain to "unencum-
bered philosophy" (21 Od: philosophia aphthono). The inference should now be clear. If eros is a 
mixture of masculinity and femininity, and philosophy is a manifestation of eros, then philosophy 
too, at its core and in its very nature, must contain both masculine and feminine elements. Consis-
tent wiU1 the implications of the three waves of tl1e Republic when applied lo the individual soul, 
the implication here is clear; genuine philosophy is androgynous. I therefore disagree with David 
Halperin ("Why Is Diotima a Woman?" in One Hundred Years of Homosexuality, pp. 113- 151 
(New York: Routledge, 1990)) and Page duBois, ("The Platonic Appropriation of Reproduction," in 
Tllana, feminist Interpretations of.fWQ, pp. 139-156) that in the Symuosjum Plato appropriates 
the feminine and reinscr ibes it for a still exclusively male philosophy. DuBois speaks of "Plato's 
desire to appropriate maternity to the male philosopher." ( 141; see also 144 and 150.). This 
strikes me again as an overly critical reading of what can with at least as much warrant be con-
strued in a much more positive way, that philosophy is constituted in its very nature by both the 
masculine and feminine, and so is accessible necessarily to both women and men. 
However, even the more positive construal that I am advocating contains a prcblem that 
needs addressing. The very cultural constructions on which I am basing the androgyuy of philoso-
phy - incompleteness with the feminine., overfullness with the masculine- are the.mselves mani-
festly informed by patriarcha.l bias. That these associations clearly inscribed in the Platonic 
Diotima's account of eros get preserved and even accentuated in Western culture as we move 
toward Freud and modernity changes nothing on this point. To associate the feminine with incom-
pleteness and ascribe completeness or overfullness to the masculine may join together in eros the 
cultllral ascriptions of the masculine and feminine then and now, but since ilie very associations 
are themselves shot through with patriarchal bias, it hardly constitutes a full transcendence of the 
cultural d.ominance of the masculine, or what is today often called phallocentrism. At this point in 
the argument, we may claim that Plato has indeed transcended the most blatant bias of his culture 
by no longer construing philosophy as entirely and completely a male activity, but he has hardly 
transcended the deeper patriarchal framework in terms of which the very concepts he employs are 
formulated. Can we, then, discover a level at which that deeper transcendence is adumbrated, if 
not fully accomplished? 
Can we, that is, develop an understanding of philosophy as it is exhibited in the Platonic 
dialogues that would make visible, in a more positive and deep way than the problematic resource-
fulness/ incompleteness contrast, its masculine and feminine character? !think so. Consider first 
perhaps the most manifest characteristic of philosophy as it appears in the Platonic dialogues and 
especially in the person of Socrates. Philosophy is fundamentally interrogative rather than asser-
tlve. As Socrates famously affirms in the Aoologv and exhibits throughout the dialogues, he does 
not claim to be wise (in the divine sense) and so does not conceive his philosophical rnissiou in 
terms of having a set of "theories" to assert and prove. Rather, Socrates Jacks wisdom, recognizes 
Ws lack, a.~d strives to OYercome it Such is his "human" wisdom, in which he stands above all 
other humans.. That is, Socrates' fundamental philosophical stance is aporia., and its consequence 
is that for him the philosophical stance is one of question i ng. To say the least, Socrates !i1·es out 
this con~quence consistently throughout hls Platonic life. 
Socrates is not wise, recognizes his lack. and stn ves to overcome it. This triadic structure 
corresponds exactly to the aocount of eras presented by Aristophanes in his myth, where eros 
arises when we humans were "split" into our present condition, and once recognizing our spUt 
state desired to become whole again, which desil'e and effort is eros (189e-194e). The same 
structure is developed more ''logically'' by Socrates in his preliminary discussion with Agathon 
before introducing Diotima (I 99d ff). Phi losophy as Socrates exhibits it, as founded in aporia., and 
as the s tance of questioning, is erotic through and through. Its maternal heritage or feminiue side 
is visible in its ontological s tatus as incomplete, lacking; its paternal side in the resourcefulness 
with which it strives to overcome that lack, even if, we sho uld note, f'mally unsuccessfully. 
But we are still working within the cultural associations of the masculine and feminine, 
completeness and incompleteness, wruch we have previously recognized as themselves 
patriarchally inscribed. Let us, then, look at the stance of questioning that is Socrates' philosophi· 
cal stance more closely, so that we can make visible its feminine and masculine elements in a 
deeper and mol'¢ pooitivc way. We can bcstn With & brief "phenomenotozy" of q11estionjn~. When 
we question something, we exhibit toward it a stance of openness. The English phrase ss apt here: 
we hold something "open to question. n Conversely. when we refuse to question our standposnls or 
convictsosu, people say that we are "close minded." Openness, we might thus say, is a fundamental 
characteristic of the Socratic philosophic stance of questioning. Socrates, when he questions this 
or that position, is and must be open to what new discoveries will emerge. 
But questioning is not simply openness. When we question something, that means tha t we 
do not simply accept it as it is; in questioning it, we respond to it, respond to it in and by o ur 
questioning. The stance of philosophic questioning, then , is characterized at once by openness and 
responsiveness; it might be called a stance of responsive openness .• And here, at a deeper level, the 
androgynous character of philosophy again becomes visible. 
for the openness of the stance of philosophic questioning corresponds both m Diotima's 
myth of croi pa.rentage and even in many contemporary cultural assumptions with the femtnine. 
Often the feminine is associated with receptivity, caring, nurtunng, all of which connote an en-
hanced openness to other.s. The responsiveness, on Ute other hand, COI'l'QlJOOds, llgllin both in 
Diotima's myth and in many of our cultural associations, \vith the masculine (aggressiveness, 
assertweness, etc.). There is a crucial difference, however, between the responsiveness/ openness 
duality and the earlier completeness/incompleteness one in that, or so I want to suggest, the 
responsiveness/ openness pair escapes the pejorative ascription to the feminine side inherent in the 
earlier association. This is especially true of the appropriateness to pltilosophy of both responsive-
ness and openness, which are, as it were, co-primordia l and equally worthy. If philosophy is 
construed after the Socra tic model as fundamentally interrogative, and if that s tance of questioning 
involves both openness and responsiveness, aud if tltose characteristics, respectively, embody the 
cultural signs of the feminine and masculine, then philosophy itself, as exhibited in the Platonic 
d1alogues, is indeed shown to be that "discrete mixture of masculinity and femininity" discussed 
earlier, an androgynous activity, best suited for women with a touch of masculme sellSibi!ity and 
for men with a touch of the feminine. 
9 
I therefore agree with those writers who note that the reasons ior Plato's "feminism" are 
more complex than his having a proto-feminist social consciousness or proto-modern egalitarian 
beliefs (which they deny). See for example janet Farrell Smith, "Plato, Irony, and Equality," p. 26, 
and Wendy Brown, "Supposing Truth Were A Woman ... ": Plato's Subversion of Masculine Dis-
course," pp. 157-158, 162, both in Tuana's Feminist Interpretations of.E!.!!t.2. Both writers, how-
ever, under~tam.l their own in~izht on this issue as critical of Plato and/ or Socrates ln its denial of 
any feminist consciousness. In so doing, however, they risk missing the deeper meaning about 
philosophy itself, that philosophy is androgynous and therefore necessarily and equally accessible 
to women and to men. 
But if so, what happened? Surely philosophy as it has developed in the West became for all 
too long a time and in all too many ways a male, all too male, enterprise, both in terms of the 
people who make up the profession and the method of argument. r close with a brief and I hope 
provocative speculation. After Greek philosophy, and especially with the rise of modern philoso-
phy in the 17th century (l am thinking especia!Jy but not only of Descartes), philosophy largely 
lost the interrogative character definitive of Socratic philosophy. rt became much more assertive, a 
matter of propounding this theory or that, proving it (ideally with indubitable certainty), and 
refuting all alternative theories. Asserting, proving, refuti.ng: these are the masculine traits com-
prising only part of the Socratic enterprise but, I suggest, which became the dominant characteris-
tics of modern philosophy. Such "pha!Jocentricism," I submit in closing, is a flmction less of our 
acceptance of the teachings of the Platonic dialogues than of our ignoring them. 
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THE OTHER SOCRATIC METHOD 
Dr. Da.n Lloyd 
In Wo me n 's Ways of Know i ng (1986), Mary Beleru:y, Blythe Clinchy, Nancy 
Goldberger, and Jill Tarule advocate a new model of college teaching and learning: The Connected 
Classroom. The Connected Classroom is a place where hierarchical relations of authority and 
power subside to allow teachers and students to engage in inquiry side-by-side and shoulder-to 
shoulder. The vehicle of learning in a connected classroom is dialogue, rather than lecture. As 
described by Paolo Freire, "Through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-
teacher cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student v.>ith students-teachers" ( 1971, p. 
67) The connected class, according to Belenk-y et al., "constructs truth not through conflict but 
through 'consensus,' whose original meaning ... was 'feeling or sensing together,' implying not 
agreement, necessarily, but a 'crossing of the barrier between ego and ego,' bridging private and 
shared experience" (p. 223). 
Dialogue, of course, has a long history in Philosophy, beginning with its unrivalled master, 
Plato. Yet the Platonic dialogue often seems to be a very different process than a "bridging of 
private and shared experience." Instead, the dialogues read as an epistemic struggle over who can 
claim to know. Socrates is the regular champion in these struggles, and Socratic progress is repre-
sented as moving from the illusion that one knows what one doesn't know to the wisdom of recog-
nizing one's ignorance, or knowing that one does not know. Socrates achieves this end again and 
again by leading his partners down sly alleys of argument to dead-end contradictions. Rarely do 
the Socratic "victims" take well to this education, and Socrates himself riled enough public figures 
to provoke his own execution in 399 B.C.E. 
Yet within the works of Plato there is one instance of a very different path to knowledge. In 
the Symposium, Socrates (as presented by Plato) confesses his own ignorance about the nature of 
love, and tells a long story about an encounter with the priestess Diotima. Diotima initiates 
Socrates in the mysteries of love, a path that begins in physical eroticism and ends in wisdom (that 
is, philosophy, the "love of wisdom"). The starting point of this ascent toward v.>isdom is conversa-
tion. The potentilll lover of wisdom begins with the eager embrace of beautiful bodies, "and ~houlu 
he happen upon someone who has a beautiful, well bred, and naturally gifted soul as well, he 
embraces the combination v.>ith great enthusiasm and immediately engages in many conversations 
with this man about virtue, about what a good man should be like, and what he should make it his 
business to do" (209c). But from this starting point one 
I 
must then realize that the beauty of sny particulu body is akin to the beauty of every othe.r body, and 
that if it is necessary to pursue beauty of fonn, it I• quite mindless not to believe that the beauty of all 
bodies ls one snd the SU~e. When he comprehend$ this, he mU$1 become a lover of aU beautiful 
bod1es. ... Aller thAt he must believe that the beauty of $0Uis is more v:tluobl! than thAt of the body •.•• AJ 
a re$ult he wm be compeUed to study the be>luty In practitlll endeavors and in laws :11\d trad•tlons. ... 
(210c) 
And onward and upward, "from practical endeavors to beautiful examples of understanding, and 
from examples of understanding to come fmaHy to that understanding which is none other than 
the understanding of that beauty itself, so that in the end he knows what beauty itself is" (21Ic). 
ln his description of beautiful conversation, and in the mutuality of love, Plato has depicted 
something akin to the connected classroom. (I think that it is not es.>ential that Plato imagines love 
erupting between two men.) The ascent from physical attraction to the apprehension of the pw·e 
Form of Beauty seems driven not by the familiar Socratic t•efutation, but by a positive affection, and 
a deepening consensus. Although this is a stretch, in these passages I read Plato as suggesting a 
form of inquiry that begins in the equality of both partners to the dialogue, rather than in a hierar-
chy of knowledge or rhetorical skill. In this one Platonic scenario, from connection comes the 
highest wisdom. 
But the Platonic picture is also distinct from the connected classroom of Belenky and her 
colleagues. The connected classroom arises from the desire for knowledge shared by teachers and 
students, and entails an environment that fosters the creation of knowledge. Care, concern, and 
other interpersonal sentiments are a part of that environment of mutual trust. But Plato locates the 
starting point not in tl1e desire to learn but in love itself, a.nd for hinllearning is the ultimate effect 
of love. And Platonic love is not the cool glow of friendship it is often taken to be; rather, it is hot 
flame, a form of madness. It begins in erotic intensity, but as the physical falls away the intensity 
remains. In the Symposium, Plato imagined knowledge flaring from tllat fire. Christianity, 
perhaps intimidated by fue intensity of Platonic love, excluded passionate love from the path to 
enlightenment (following another thread in Plato, the distinction between Reason and Appetite) . 
And to this day, we think of learning as a bloodless business of the intellect, seen in opposition to 
the disruptive passions of fue heart. 
Perhaps it is insignificant that Plato has Diotima describe the ladder of love: a woman's 
way of knowing. It may also be that the connected classroom is a good learning environment not 
only for women (as Belenky eta!. maintain), but for everyone. In my own teaching, tclerance for 
otllers' points of view often metamorphoses into a fondness shared among all tlle members of the 
class, growing through collaboration and dialogue. Diotima's message is that Platonic mind-to-
mind affection may be more th.an just a warm and fuzzy side-effect of connected classrooms, but 
might in itself drive students and teachers toward a more intense love of learning. Though far 
more restrained than among the Athenians, Platonic love is part of the fuel of learnins in the 
modern connected class. 
At the end of Toni Morrison's Beloved, the protagonists Sethe and Paul D. reconcile their 
differences and tentatively contemplate a future together. Morrison shows us Paul D.'s yearning 
for a life with Sethe with tllis plain and beautiful statement: 
He wants to put hh S10!1' next to hers (p. 273). 
The modern images of love are generally too graphic, and the modern consumers of love too 
impatient, to recognize Morrison's marvelous truth about the core impulse of love. 'Wnen we take 
the time to put our stories next to each other, we eA-perience botlllove and learning. This will be 
true both in the classroom and out. In this consensus of Belenky and colleagues, D.iotima, and 
Morri.son, there may be a convergence of loving and knowing that is feminist, humane, and wise. 
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